Introduction
This paper seeks to show that the existing regulation of corporate decision making fails to provide a comprehensive shield to minority shareholders. Instead of urging another addition to the plethora of statutory controls over corporations the authors suggest a more radical, but simple solution to this lacuna.
This radical and simple solution would be to apply the rules of natural justice to corporate decision making, thus providing a safety net of last resort for minority shareholders who are unable to gain the protection of a statutory or common law remedy. TTiere is no doubt that at present the law governing the decision making powers of companies, at a board level or in the general meeting, are inadequate, at least insofar as procedural matters are concerned. As injustice may arise as a result of this inadequacy it will be submitted that the principles of natural justice should apply to company decisions.
Against this backdrop this article considers the existing regulation of corporate decisions before examining the bases for the imposition of natural justice. The grounds for denying the implication of natural justice will also be discussed. Ultimately we will conclude that there is no insurmountable barrier to the application of the rules of natural justice to corporate decision making organs.
The authors acknowledge that the solution we propose involves important policy considerations. This policy debate has been addressed in other articles. 1 Our paper is based on the premise that once it is accepted that it is possible to move or adjust the private/public boundary then important advantages could occur to minority shareholders.
(a) The Existing Regulation of Corporate Decisions
Before considering the arguments for change it is necessary to query whether the principles of natural justice would add anything to existing remedies available to a shareholder affected by a corporate decision.
There is the argument that there is no need for the principles of administrative law to enter the domain of companies, as there are already common law 2 and statutory remedies 3 which may be available to an aggrieved shareholder affected by a particular decision of a board of directors or a general meeting. But these remedies have been hamstrung by the reluctance of judges to become
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involved in corporate decision making. This understandable reluctance has been founded upon judicial acknowledgment of the mutual consent between the members upon which the corporate form is based -in becoming a member each individual accepts the decision making powers of the board of directors and of the majority of members in general meeting.
Thus, in Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd 4 a majority of the High Court was at pains to point out that the existing statutory remedies did not give the courts a licence "for an unwarranted assumption of the responsibility for the management of the company". 5 The decision in Zephyr Holdings Pty Ltd v. Jack Chia (Australia) Ltd 6 also represents a further example of the judiciary limiting grounds for review of the merits of commercial decisions under the statutory remedies embodied in the Corporations Law.
It is apparent that at least some commentators are dissatisfied with the scope of remedies available to members of companies. Indeed, the Company and Securities Advisory Committee has recommended that the current statutory remedies be complemented by a statutory derivative action. 7 This ongoing search for additional protective measures for members of corporations has usually terminated at a call for greater statutory regulation. We consider that the potential application of natural justice to at least some decisions taken by company members in general meeting or by a board of directors might be a better and easier alternative.
In the context of judicial and legislative concern that corporate decisions be just, it seems strange that little attention has been paid to the imposition of a requirement that decisions be reached in a procedurally fair manner. At present the requirements as to the actual conduct of company general meetings are not statutorily defined while the common law rules are imprecise and therefore offer little protection to minority shareholders. 8 Until the early 1990s the literature in this area was relatively silent. Currently there is a major debate about the extent to which corporations should be subject to administrative law. 9 Highlighting this gap in protection is the case of Re Direct Acceptance 10 where a general meeting of the company was convened for the purpose of considering a scheme of arrangement. The meeting was conducted at a noisy venue which was too small for the number of attendees to be suitably accommodated. After just half an hour the Chairman called for a vote upon the motion, despite objections from the floor that there had been an inadequate opportunity for debate. In respect of an application for court approval of the resolution, pursuant to s.315(4) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code, 11 it was in part argued that the Court's approval should not be granted upon the basis that the chairperson had breached his common law duty to supervise the general meeting satisfactorily. In the course of dismissing this attack upon the validity of the resolution, McLelland J noted that: 24 QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL "... on such a matter as this the chairman as a matter of law has a wide discretion with which the court will not interfere, unless the exercise of that discretion can be shown to be invalid, eg, on the ground that it was exercised in bad faith.... The law recognises that in a purely procedural matter such as the control of the debate the chairman must of necessity have considerable latitude of action in making decisions which will bind those present, particularly when his decision has the support of a majority of the meeting ..."
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McLelland J carried on to note that the absence of an adequate opportunity to debate the proposed scheme of arrangement at the general meeting "reinforced the desirability" of the Court giving close consideration as to whether the scheme ought be approved. In the end, such approval was not granted.
It seems odd that McLelland J would on the one hand find that the chairman had fulfilled his legal duties, while at the same time reaching the conclusion that there had been an inadequate opportunity to debate the motion. The time is clearly ripe for a reconsideration of the law governing the manner in which decisions are made by corporate decision making organs. Some judges, like McLelland J, are facing the unnecessary dilemma of paying lip service to the formal state of the law while nevertheless conjuring a fair result.
We would argue that the principles of natural justice should, and can be applied to corporate decision making organs, without violating any fundamental principle of corporate or administrative law. While the imposition of the rules of natural justice would afford an alternative to that used in Re Direct Acceptance it would not be an avenue for the judicial reconsideration of corporate decisions on their merits. By using the principles of natural justice judges would only be ensuring that the binding decision of the majority was made upon an informed basis. Thus the courts would not be second guessing the decision making organs of companies, and therefore avoiding the temptation to review the merits of a commercial decision.
The Bases for the Imposition of Natural Justice
It is our argument that there is no real case law barrier which excludes extending the application of the rules of natural justice to the processes of corporate decision making. We maintain this argument on two grounds. First, that the post 1985 approach to the Australian High Court, commencing with Kioa v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 13 could easily be used to provide minority shareholders with the shield of natural justice.
14 Secondly, we argue that recent judicial approaches to corporate law matters would bring many aspects of corporate decision making within the operation of natural justice principles outlined in the Privy Council decision of Durayappah v. Fernando. 15 The decision in Durayappah has been subsumed by the developments in Kioa andAinsworth v. Criminal Justice Commission 16 but our argument is that, even if the holding in Kioa was not accepted as making a major change to the operation of the principles of natural justice, the holding in Durayappah could be used to support our case. The new High Court approach is more like a minimal compliance approach. A decision maker or Court must always work on the basis that a person is entitled to natural justice, unless there is a clear statutory exemption, and then establish whether that person has received at least the minimal level of procedural fairness 18 necessary in the light of the circumstances of that particular case. The factors mentioned in the Durayappah formula and its later interpretations of rights, interests and legitimate expectations, then become crucial determinants of the level of procedural fairness owed to a person affected by a particular decision or exercise of power.
For the purposes of this article this new approach to procedural fairness significantly strengthens the argument that minority shareholders can claim a right to procedural fairness. This claim is even stronger when we examine the various propositions developed by the High Court since 1985 and the range of decision making covered by a requirement of procedural fairness.
The following propositions can be extracted from Australian administrative law cases since 1985:
1.A common law duty to accord procedural fairness unless a clear contrary statutory exemption. 2. The presumption of procedural fairness applies to the exercise of any statutory power. 3.The presumption will also apply to non-statutory powers including prerogative powers. 4. It is the nature of the power and the interest affected by that exercise which is crucial and not the formal character of the power. The idea of a common law duty was put forward by Mason J in Kioa and has been endorsed by the other members of the High Court in subsequent cases. 19 Brennan J argued in Kioa that the presumption for a duty to observe natural justice applies when: "... the exercise of [any statutory power] which is apt to affect the interests of an individual alone or apt to affect his interests in a manner which is substantially different from the manner in which its exercise is apt to affect the interests of the public. Of course, the presumption may be displaced by the text of the statute, the nature of the power and the administrative framework created by the statute within which the power is to be exercised".
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The High Court and various State Supreme Courts have now applied the rules of procedural fairness to a wide range of decision makers exercising both statutory and prerogative powers. These have included the Governor in Council, Royal Commissioners, Ministers and investigations conducted by an inspector under the companies legislation. 21 Since the early 1980s Australian courts have been extending the coverage of the principles of natural justice or in modern parlance procedural fairness. The extent of this coverage has reached the stage where McCann make it clear that not only is there a common law duty to accord procedural fairness but the duty arises as a result of the type of power being exercised and the interests being affected. In Ainsworth four members of the High Court wrote:
"It is now clear that a duty of procedural fairness arises, if at all, because the power involved is one which may destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations. Thus, what is decisive is the nature of the power, not the character of the proceeding which attends its exercise".
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The High Court's approach to procedural fairness could easily tolerate the concept applying to corporate decision making. The power exercised by the board of directors or the general meeting of a company certainly is able to prejudice a person's legitimate expectations or interests. The nature of corporate decision making power is certainly of the type which demands that procedural fairness at some level should be accorded to shareholders.
In the next section we will establish that in some instances, minority shareholders could meet the requirements of the stricter and more exclusive Durayappah formula: the High Court's post 1985 approach to procedural fairness only further strengthens the submission that shareholders be accorded natural justice.
(b) The Traditional Approach
If it cannot be accepted that the developments in Kioa have led to a major change in the law of natural justice so that its principles can be deductively extended into the area of protecting minority shareholders per se we would maintain that developments in the law from Ridge v. Baldwin 23 to Durayappah could be used to justify this change. 25 In the leading judgment in Ridge v. Baldwin Lord Reid rejected the nature of the decision making body as the determinative factor in the implication of natural justice, adopting instead the decision in Wood v. Woad 26 which simply looked to the existence of the power in a body to decide matters as attracting the rules of natural justice: "This rule is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals".
27
Ridge v. Baldwin is therefore important as the case which triggered the subsequent expansion in the application of natural justice. But Lord Reid provided little positive guidance for defining the parameters of natural justice in the future, merely noting that natural justice is amenable to further development 28 and that previous decisions indicated that it would be inapplicable in some restricted circumstances. 
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The Privy Council decision in Durayappah v. Fernando 30 attempted to answer doubts arising from the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin by suggesting that the otherwise unlimited scope of natural justice might be confined if three factors were considered:
1.the nature of the individual's interest affected by the decision; 2.the circumstances in which the challenged decision may be made; and 3.the nature of the sanctions which may be imposed.
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In subsequent decisions a fourth factor has been added: 4.the nature of the tribunal exercising the decision making power.
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These factors may at first sight indicate the triumph of objectively ascertainable parameters over the otherwise broad notion of fairness which underlies natural justice, but the tension between notions of fairness and attempts to delimit its application by objective standards remains. This tension may be illustrated by considering the application of the Durayappah factors to company decision makers. It is our contention that in many cases a minority shareholder would be able to demonstrate that their case came within the parameters where natural justice could be applied.
(i) The Nature of the Individual's Interest Affected by the Decision
The interest of a member in a company, (be it a company limited by shares, a company limited by guarantee, a no liability company or an unlimited liability company) represents a bundle of proprietary rights which may be affected by a corporate decision. 33 The first element is satisfied.
(
ii) The Circumstances in which the Challenged Decision may be made
At one time it may have been said that the board of directors or the general meeting had an unfettered discretion to decide matters within their jurisdiction; only confined by the requirement that decisions be in the interests of the company as a whole. 34 However, recent commentators suggest 35 that this broad discretion is not necessarily a bar to the implication of natural justice as the courts may view this requirement on a subjective basis, by examining the actual grounds upon which a decision is made. 36 Alternatively, the existence of an absolute discretion will not exclude the rules of natural justice provided that the other Durayappah factors favour their implication. 37 Thus, in Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission 38 a wide discretion was nevertheless held subject to natural justice because the Court appears to have concentrated upon the subjective nature of the serious consequences for the appellant arising from the decision of the Racing Commission. 39 Nevertheless there is contrary authority to suggest that the existence 43 In other cases where natural justice was implied there may have been a broad discretion but the decision maker is nevertheless directed to consider some particular fact. 44 Another line of authority suggests that the discretion of the board of directors may not be as unfettered as originally thought. While there is no doubt that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company, 4^ in some circumstances they will also owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders as well as creditors. In Walker v. Wimborne, 46 Mason J considered that the trial judge was in error because:
"... the emphasis given by the primary judge to the circumstances that the group derived a benefit from the transaction tended to obscure the fundamental principles that each of the companies was a separate and independent legal entity, and that it was the duty of the directors of Asiatic to consult its interests and its interests alone in deciding whether payments should be made to other companies. In this respect it should be emphasised that the directors of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take account of the interest of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to take into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them".
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Recently the House of Lords has reiterated that the director's fiduciary dutv is not solely owed to the company. In Winkworth v. Edward Barron Development Co. Ltd™ Lord Templeman commented that:
"[A] company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. The company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred and the company is not obliged to avoid all ventures which involve an element of risk, but the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts. The conscience of the company, as well as its management, is confided to its directors. A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors". 49 This extension of the fiduciary duty reflects that the discretion of directors is increasingly being constrained and that it is no longer correct to deny natural justice on the basis that the decision making organs of a company have an unfettered discretion. Furthermore, the enactment of statutory remedies for minority shareholders such as ss.260,461 and 1324 of the Corporations Law all point to the directors' discretion being restricted.
Therefore the second Durayappah factor, while not clearly being supportive of the application of natural justice to the decisions of a board of directors, or the general meeting, is not necessarily contrary to its implication. A directors' discretion is not unfettered and there is the strong likelihood of directors' duties being owed to shareholders. (iii) The Nature of the Sanctions which may be Imposed
As to the third factor, decisions of companies may have the effect of destroying property rights or affecting a person's reputation, 50 both of which have been held sufficient to require the observance of natural justice. 51 This factor supports the implication of natural justice.
iv) The Nature of the Tribunal Exercising the Decision Making Power
As the decisions of a board of directors or the general meeting are not of a judicial character, this factor will militate against the application of natural justice. However, what must be remembered is that natural justice has been applied to non-commercial organisations in nonjudicial, or at best, quasi-judicial circumstances, 52 and with the increasing interventionist approach of the judiciary in the administrative law area, this factor does not carry great weight. 53 From the above outline it may be seen that only the first and third factors support the implication of natural justice to corporate decision makers, while the other two factors may militate against this conclusion. This points to a fundamental deficiency of the Durayappah formula in that no solution is offered to the situation where consideration of the factors points to contrary conclusions. It is arguable that in such situations the Courts will consider the Durayappah factors initially, but ultimately resolve the apparent conflict by resorting to an assessment of the relative merits of "justice" and "fairness" to the individual as against the perceived social costs in determining whether natural justice ought apply in "frontier" cases. Given the judicial and legislative concern to implement minimum requirements of justice in company decisions 54 it may be suggested that in particular circumstances the requirements of natural justice ought to be considered as ancillary to existing common law and statutory protections for minority shareholders. 
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The Durayappah formula was developed at a time when the judiciary were still exercising caution with the application of the principles of natural justice. Yet despite this design feature we have demonstrated that in a number of areas a minority shareholder could mount a strong case for the application of the principles of natural justice. This case is further strengthened when we consider the current approach of the High Court of Australia to the question of natural justice or procedural fairness.
Some Reasons for Denying the Implication of Natural Justice
Where the requirements of natural justice conflict with a common law principle of greater weight, the cause of "justice" is set aside. 55 What must therefore be considered is whether the principles of private property and the privity of contract, which form an essential part of company law, should overrule the application of natural justice to companies.
The objection that judicial intervention in the corporate domain would amount to an interference with the contract embodied in the articles of incorporation 56 may be founded upon outmoded notions of contract law.
Recent decisions in areas such as the doctrine of frustration 57 and promissory estoppel 58 point to an interventionist judiciary seeking to ameliorate perceived injustices arising from laissez-faire tenets which underlie much of contract law. 59 The Tables A and  B of the Corporations Law can be excluded or modified (see s. 176). Furthermore, "the extent of the contractual effect of the memorandum and articles is difficult to determine in the light of inconsistent court decisions and is the subject of academic debate": P. Lipton and A. Herzberg Understanding Company Law 5th edition Law Book Co. Sydney 1993 at 96. In addition as there is an established body of law dealing with the implication of natural justice principles into established statutory regimes it is submitted that it is preferable to import common law notions of natural justice than to increase the body of legislation. This is particularly so in light of the desire of the Federal Government to simplify the Corporations Law. It should be noted that on 7 October 1993, the Attorney-General, Mr Michael Lavarch announced four appointments to a Task Force to simplify the Corporations Law to achieve a comprehensive userfriendly law. It is also submitted that little would be achieved by amending the ASX Listing Rules to provide for natural justice. The Listing Rules will be restricted to a small category of corporations and "just how far the Listing Rules will impose obligations on the companies which seek listing on the ASX remain a matter of some doubt": R. The confusion as to the applicability of Cameron v. Hogan lends strength to the argument that administrative law should be applied to both incorporated and unincorporated associations. Judges in cases like Paton and McKinnon have by the end of each case, exercised judicial reasoning until the same result is achieved as would have occurred with an application of administrative law principles.
Natural justice has never been restricted by arbitrary notions of "public" law. From this observation it follows either that the categorisation of natural justice as exclusively a public law principle is erroneous, or that the definition of public law is too narrow. Any objection to the use of natural justice in company dealings then becomes based on the merits of the idea rather than on the basis that this proposal would mix public with private law.
Conclusion
The writers see no fundamental impediment to the application of the rules of natural justice to decisions made by a board of directors or a general meeting. The result would be to protect the minority shareholder by ensuring that procedural fairness of the decision making process which may affect their interest. We would see the judiciary, not reviewing a commercial decision made on the merits, but ensuring that business decisions are made in an environment of equity towards all those directly or indirectly affected.
The application of the rules of natural justice to corporate decision making might at first appear contradictory. After all, some texts on administrative law indicate that public law is confined to the exercise of public power. 87 This would seem to suggest that the corporate form, based as it is upon the private law of contract, cannot attract the requirements of natural justice. But it is not true to say that associations founded upon contract have eluded the requirements of natural justice. In any case, to deny the application of natural justice to corporate decision making merely because such decision making is countenanced by a contract, is to fly in the face of the broad notions of equity which underpin the development of the principles of natural justice. If the application of the principles of natural justice to corporate decision making engenders betterinformed decisions, without imposing undue burdens upon the decision making organs, can the employment of the principles of natural justice be said to be inimical to the Australian corporate community?
The trend towards commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation of public authorities could strengthen the case that administrative law, especially the rules of natural justice, should not be confined to a narrow definition of public law. A debate over whether Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) should be subject to administrative law is currently underway. 88 In association with this trend towards privatisation has been the increasing growth of bureaucracy in corporations. 89 
